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be that any attempt to introduce a basic change of direction
would simply delay the introduction of a long-needed reform. On
the other hand, the history of reform in this area suggests that
delay may be inevitable in any event. It is now 30 years since the
Select Committee of the Ontario Legislature 55 first recommended
the recognition of non-possessory garagemen's liens. It is 13 years
since the O.L.R.C. submitted its report. If there is to be a similar
delay in action on the Discussion Paper, an opportunity may still
exist to develop a scheme for repair and storage security within
the framework of the P.P.S.A. which is in harmony with other
types of secured financing in Ontario.
Arthur L. Close*
THE RAPE OF THE LOCK:
A COMMENT ON CHARANIA v. TRAVELERS
INDEMNITY CO. OF CANADA
One of the difficulties in trying to teach insurance law is that
one has to fight against the notion that most of the cases involve
mere questions of "construction". Viewed thus, insurance law
becomes a myriad of single instances. No single case is of any
great significance. Unfortunately, this view obscures the fact that
the construction of a policy may be something that is of vital
consequence to tens of thousands of individuals.
In Charania v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of Canada1 the Ontario
Court of Appeal gave a brisk judgment dismissing the insured's
claim, without any appreciation of the social consequences of its
decision.
The case involved a burglary policy which the insured had
taken out. The trial judge found that the store had been entered
by someone picking the lock in the front door. There was
evidence to support this finding. A police expert said that on the
cylinder of the lock of the front door he discovered gouge marks
which were evidence that the lock had been picked. The cylinder
was inside the door.
55 Supra, footnote 4.
'Chairman, Law Reform Commission of British Columbia.
1 (1984), 12 D.L.R. (4th) 478, 47 O.R. (2d) 705 (C.A.).
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The difficulty in this case arises because the insurer defined
"burglary" in part, thus: 2
" 'Burglary' means the felonious abstraction of insured property (1) from
within the Premises by a person making a felonious entry therein by actual
force and violence, of which force and violence there are visible marks
made by tools, explosives, electricity or chemicals upon, or physical
damage to the exterior of the Premises at the place of such entry .... "
The trial judge held that a mark inside the lock could constitute
a mark "visible ... to the exterior of the premises ' 3 and found for
the insured.
Brooke J.A., writing for a unanimous Court of Appeal,
reversed the decision. The critical part of the court's opinion
reads: 4
We think that the words of this policy must be given their ordinary
meaning and, that being so, the marks being invisible because they were
inside could not be marks that were visible upon the exterior of the
premises.
The only thing that prevents the reader from laughing out loud
at this point is the realization that thousands of businesses and
thousands of car owners have identical or very similar policies. 5
Now, I am not a big believer in the doctrine of
unconscionability, 6 but it appears to me to be unconscionable for
an insurer to refuse to pay for a loss which it does not deny is
genuine, merely because the burglar did not do a little violence to
the exterior of the lock. The insured in this case appears to be as
deserving of relief as, say, an expectant heir who sells his/her
inheritance at a gross undervalue, 7 or drunks who damage rented
cars, 8 or amnesiacs who sign mortgages or guarantees in a bank. 9
2 Ibid., at p. 479 D.L.R., p. 705 O.R. Emphasis added by Brooke J.A.
3 Ibid., at p. 480 D.L.R., p. 706 O.R. Arnup and Blair JJ. A. concurred in the judgment.
4 Ibid., at p. 480 D.L.R., p. 707 O.R.
5 This definition of burglary comes from U.S. policies. English insurers merely require
that the insured prove that the burglar used "force and violence" to procure entry; see
Re Calf and The Sun Insurance Office, [1920] 2 K.B. 366 (C.A.). Even the English
requirement can cause great hardship. It would offer no protection in a case such as
Lichtentag v. Millers Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 250 So. 2d 105 (La. Ct. App., 1971)
where burglars forced at gunpoint the insured to open the outer door of his safe and then
forcibly opened the inner door.
6 My position on unconscionability is: "I am ... not opposed to using unconscionability as
a means of striking out unfair provisions in standard form contracts, provided this device
is recognized as being the poor second best that it is": see Hasson, "The Unconsciona-
bility Business - A Comment on Tilden Rent-A-Car Co. v. Clendenning", 3 C. B. L.J.
193 (1978), at p. 196.
7 See e.g., Bawtree v. Watson (1834), 3 My. & K. 339, and see generally S. M. Waddams,
The Law of Contracts, 2nd ed. (Toronto, Canada Law Book Inc., 1984), at p. 381.
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Indeed, if counsel for the insured had looked a little further
afield, he would have discovered U.S. authorities which have
held this provision to be unconscionable.
First, in Ferguson v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of New York,10 the
Supreme Court of Kansas held invalid a "visible exterior marks
provision" as being contrary to public policy.
In the court's words:11
We hold that where a rule of evidence is imposed by a provision in an
insurance policy, as here, the assertion of such rule by the insurance carrier,
beyond the reasonable requirements necessary to prevent fraudulent claims
against it in proof of the substantive conditions imposed by the policy,
contravenes the public policy of this state.
A subsequent noteworthy authority is the leading case of C. &
J. Fertilizer v. Allied Mutual Insurance,12 a decision of the
Supreme Court of Iowa. In that case, although the exterior of the
premises was neither damaged nor visibly marked, the thief had
broken an interior door in order to steal chemicals worth $9,582.
Truck tire marks were visible in the driveway leading to an
entrance in the warehouse that could be opened forcibly without
leaving visible marks. When the insurer pleaded that no visible
marks had been left, the Iowa Supreme Court held by a majority
of 5 to 4 that the provision was invalid.
Five judges held that the provision was invalid because (1) it
violated the reasonable expectations of the insured, and (2)
because it was unconscionable. Further, three judges held that
the provision violated the implied warranty of fitness which, they
held, applied to insurance contracts.
8 See Tilden Rent-A-Car Co. v. Clendenning (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 400, 18 O.R. (2d) 601
(C.A.).
9 See e.g., McKenzie v. Bank of Montreal (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 641, 7 O.R. (2d) 521
(H.C.J.) affd 70 D.L.R. (3d) 113, 12 O.R. (2d) 719 (C.A.). (In this case the defendant
claimed that she did not know that she was signing a mortgage despite the fact that she
signed nine copies of the document.) See also Royal Bank of Canada v. Hinds (1978), 88
D.L.R. (3d) 428, 20 O.R. (2d) 613 (H.C.J.), in which the defendant was able to gain
relief because she alleged that she could not remember signing a document agreeing to
pay off her deceased husband's debts to the bank.
10 370 P. 2d 379 (1962).
11 Ibid., at p. 387.
12 227 N.W. 2d 169 (Iowa, 1975); see the excellent note on this case in 64 Geo. L.J. 987
(1976). Attempts to strike down an identical provision in an auto theft policy have so far
not met with success; see e.g., Limberis v. Aetna Cas. & Sur Co., 263 A. 2d 83 (Me.,
1970); Cochran v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co., 271 N.W. 2d 331 (Neb., 1976).
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The minority in C. & J. Fertilizer thought the impugned clause
was reasonable because it gave the insurer protection against
fraudulent claims (or "inside jobs"). Without being an expert in
burglary, it would seem to me that the burglar will use as little
violence against locks and other parts of the building as possible.
First, it is quicker to jiggle a lock open than it is to use a saw or
explosives. Secondly, it is quieter.
Conclusion
Insurance companies are already the darlings of contract law.
Thus, they alone are owed duties of disclosure by applicants for
insurance. 13 They can adduce evidence of a material misrepresen-
tation in a way that would not be accepted in any other
contractual context 14 and they can frequently disown the fraud
and negligence of their own agents.15 To immunize them also
from the doctrine of unconscionability, such as it is, is carrying a
good joke too far. 16
But apart from adding to the privileges of insurance compa-
nies, the decision in Charania is of great importance to thousands
of Canadian shop owners and car owners. Failure by the courts
and the Provincial Superintendents of Insurance to have this
13 See Hasson, "The Doctrine of 'Uberrima Fides' in Insurance Law - A Critical Evalua-
tion", 32 M.L.R. 615 (1969). According to G. H. Treitel, family arrangements are said
to be the only class of contracts (together with insurance) which can be described as
uberrimaefidei. See his Law of Contract, 6th ed. (London, Stevens & Sons, 1983), pp.
304-6. P. S. Atiyah takes the view that the insurance contract is the only one which is
truly uberrimaefidei apart from the contract of partnership: see his An Introduction to
the Law of Contract, 3rd ed. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981). Waddams, op. cit.,
footnote 7, at p. 323, states that "Some contracts, notably insurance contracts, are
characterized as contracts of utmost good faith (contracts uberrimae fidei)" but the
learned author does not tell us what these other contracts are.14 See, notably, Henwood v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America (1967), 64 D.L.R. (2d)
715, [1967] S.C.R. 720. In this case the Supreme Court of Canada accepted an insurer's
view of what was a material misrepresentation on the assertion of the insurer's company
doctor who was allowed to give expert evidence in psychiatry, a field in which he had no
expertise.
15 See e.g., Blanchette v. C.I.S. Ltd. (1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 561, [1973] S.C.R. 833.
16 In Pridmore v. Calvert (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 133 (B.C.S.C.), Toy J. held that a
payment by an adjuster of $331.40 did not fairly compensate a plaintiff for injuries for
which $20,000 would be a satisfactory settlement. Further, in Beach v. Eames (1976), 82
D.L.R. (3d) 736, 18 O.R. (2d) 486 (Co. Ct.), the court held that a settlement of $500
could not stand when the victim had suffered damages which the court fixed at
$48,066.92. But these cases indicate that the protection will be given only in scandalous
cases. In no Canadian case has a court, to my knowledge, held a provision in an
insurance contract to be invalid because it was unconscionable or unfair.
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provision removed constitutes a gross dereliction of duty to policy
holders who do not have the economic power to rid themselves of
this cruel trap.
Reuben Hasson*
MARVCO COLOR RESEARCH LTD. v. HARRIS'
"'Is the defence of non est factum available to a party who,
knowing that a document has a legal effect, carelessly fails to read
the document thereby permitting a third party to perpetrate a
fraud on another innocent party?' "2 The Supreme Court
answered "No", applying the decision of the English House of
Lords in Saunders v. Anglia Building Society3 and overruling their
earlier decision in Prudential Trust Co. Ltd. v. Cugnet.4 The
wording of the above question invites the answer given, and
suggests that the 26 years since the Prudential decision has been a
period of injustice in this area of Canadian law. However, the
case for retaining the Prudential decision has not been fully
argued, and it can be shown that, both on the facts of the Marvco
decision and more generally, the Prudential position is both more
just and more rational than Saunders.
The facts
In Marvco the respondents were husband and wife, and the
document at issue was a mortgage signed by both as collateral for
a guarantee previously signed by the husband alone. The signa-
tures to the mortgage were obtained by deception, the husband
being told it related to discrepancies in an earlier mortgage he
had signed, and the wife being told it was " ' "just to correct the
date" ' "5 in the same mortgage. On the basis of this document
the person perpetrating the deception, a boy friend of the respon-
dents' daughter, persuaded the appellant to release his business
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
1(1982), 141 D.L.R. (3d) 577, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 774.
2 Ibid., at p. 580 D.L.R., p. 778 S.C.R.
3 [1971] A.C. 1004 (H.L.).
4 (1956), 5 D.L.R. (2d) 1, [1956] S.C.R. 914.
5 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 579 D.L.R., p. 777 S.C.R.
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